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Abstract:
According to numerous studies, the election-year economy influences presidential election
results far more than cumulative growth throughout the term. Here we describe a series of
surveys and experiments that point to an intriguing explanation for voter behavior that runs
contrary to the standard explanations political science has offered, but one that accords with a
large psychological literature. Voters, we find, actually intend to judge presidents on cumulative
growth. However, since that characteristic is not readily available to them, voters inadvertently
substitute election-year performance because it is more easily accessible. This “end-heuristic”
explanation for voters’ election-year emphasis reflects a general tendency for people to simplify
retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole. The end heuristic
explanation also suggests a remedy, a way to align voters’ actions with their intentions.
Providing people with the attribute they are seeking—cumulative growth—eliminates the
election-year emphasis.
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Voters, the data suggest, reward incumbents not broadly for economic growth throughout
incumbents' terms, but narrowly for conditions in the six months or year before Election Day
(e.g., Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Kiewiet 1983; Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993; Achen
and Bartels 2004). Surveying the evidence, Achen and Bartels (2004) conclude that “long-term
economic growth, whether in real income or GDP, contributes little or nothing to the incumbent
party’s electoral prospects.” In this article, we seek to understand this behavior, which creates at
least three major problems for democratic accountability.
First, voter behavior incentivizes politicians to also focus on election-year growth, with
substantial consequences for public welfare. As Tufte (1978) wrote, it creates “a bias towards
policies with immediate, highly visible benefits and deferred, hidden costs—myopic policies for
myopic voters” (143). In perhaps the clearest U.S. example, the Nixon administration pressured
Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns to pursue expansionary monetary policy in late 1971
and early 1972, which helped precipitate high inflation in the years that followed (Greider 1989;
Abrams 2006). Second, the election-year focus can lead to adverse selection. Instead of selecting
the best economic leaders, democracies may select the best economic manipulators. Finally, the
election-year focus may make voters less likely to select the best leaders simply by introducing
noise, turning democracy into a game of “musical chairs” where elections are determined not so
much by the quality of the candidates, but by the vagaries of the business cycle (Achen and
Bartels 2004). Bartels (2008, 110) finds that if voters focused more on the overall economy
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during presidents’ terms, they would have elected a different president in three postwar elections
(1952, 1968, and 2000).1
So why do voters, who presumably would like to maximize economic welfare and elect
capable leaders, respond primarily to the election-year economy? More generally, why do
recency effects emerge not just with the economy, but also in domains such as legislative
appropriations, crime, and terrorist attacks?2 To test the potential explanations, we consider
evidence from a series of surveys and experiments.
We first attempt to answer a fundamental but unaddressed question relevant to all
explanations: what are voters’ intentions? Across a wide variety of elicitation methods, we find
that voters intend to weigh the years of a president’s term similarly. To determine why voters
place much greater weight on the election-year economy despite their intentions to do otherwise,
we conduct studies where we show participants economic conditions during presidents’ terms.
After viewing simple plots of either historical or hypothetical yearly personal income growth
during each term, participants evaluate overall economic conditions. We then examine how
much influence (weight) each year has on their evaluations. Even though participants observe
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Voters’ election-year emphasis can also affect the entry decisions of challengers, who face

greater uncertainty due to the unknown election-year economy. The election-year emphasis may
also limit incentives to pursue strong growth earlier in a term if mean-reversion in growth early
on makes robust growth in the election year easier to achieve.
2

For example, see Shepsle et al. (2009, 357), Muthoo and Shepsle (2010), and Levitt (1996).

Several studies also find evidence of recency effects, and the perverse incentives they create,
with terrorist attacks (Bali 2007; Aksoy 2011; Montalvo 2011).
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growth for all four years, their behavior closely resembles actual voter behavior. That is, despite
intending to weigh income growth in all years roughly equally, they nevertheless overweigh the
last year.
We first use these studies to test two standard explanations for why voters overweigh the
end: that voters either simply fail to remember earlier conditions (e.g., Sarafidis 2007) or that
they perceive the election year as more informative (e.g., Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).
Instead of supporting these explanations, however, our findings point to an intriguing alternative,
which we call the “end heuristic” explanation. While this explanation deviates from the standard
ones offered by political science for voter behavior, it accords with a large body of evidence
from psychology.3
According to this explanation, voters intend to judge presidents on overall performance
rather than election-year conditions, but overall performance during the term is not readily
available to them. Even if some candidates, such as Obama in the current election, attempt to
focus on the long term, the media focus mainly on recent economic conditions.4 More generally,
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While the end heuristic explanation has not been tested as an explanation for myopic economic

voting, Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) argue that usage of a “peak-and-end” heuristic can help
to explain why German voters rewarded robust disaster response. In addition, a growing political
science literature has considered how other heuristics affect voters (e.g., Kuklinski and Quirk
2000; Berry and Howell 2007; Oliver and Ha 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Duch and Tyran
2012).
4

We classified a random sample of broadcast media transcripts covering the US economy in the

months preceding the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections according to the time period
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it takes cognitive effort to discern total performance over the term. With total performance not
readily available, voters do what decision makers have been shown to do in many other
environments where retrospective assessments are involved: they simplify a complicated
evaluation problem by substituting end conditions for overall conditions (Varey and Kahneman
1992; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Ariely and Carmon 2000). As Kahneman (2011)
recently put it, “people who face a difficult question often answer an easier one instead, without
realizing it” (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2003). We argue that voters are doing
something similar when confronted with the cognitively difficult task of summing conditions
over an extended period, precisely the kind of situation where psychologists have found that
people tend to rely on the end to represent the whole. Despite trying to evaluate overall
performance over a term, our subjects appear to focus on the election-year economy because that
attribute is an easily available substitute for the overall growth for which they are searching.
We then use a variation on our experimental design to directly test the end heuristic
explanation. If voters are indeed accidentally substituting election-year growth for cumulative
growth, then curing this tendency—that is, helping them apply the weights they intend to
apply—should be straightforward. As suggested by research in psychology (e.g., Liersch and
McKenzie 1992), we should only have to make cumulative growth equally available. We find
precisely this pattern. When we provide participants information on cumulative performance
(e.g., total income growth during incumbents’ terms or income in levels), they no longer focus

they covered. 96% of those articles covered economic conditions in the year preceding the
election, with much less covering earlier conditions. Please see the supporting information (SI)
for complete details.
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on the election year. Instead, they weigh all years roughly equally. Thus, while our results
provide evidence of voters failing to act the way they intend with important implications for
democratic accountability, they also point to a potential remedy for recency effects that
government statistical agencies, the news media, and candidates could adopt.

Why the election-year economy? Three explanations
Political scientists have considered a variety of explanations for the weight voters place
on the election-year economy. An obvious explanation pertains to memory. Compared to their
memories of a year ago, voters’ memories of economic conditions in earlier years of the term
may be faint or inaccurate (e.g., Sarafidis 2007). Even if they intend to answer Reagan's question
(“Are you better off than you were four years ago?”), they may not be able to simply because
they lack the necessary information about earlier economic conditions.
A second explanation is that voters may see the election-year economy as more
informative about the quality of the president's economic stewardship. They may view the
president’s policies as taking months or years to influence the economy. Therefore, they may
perceive economic performance at the end as particularly revealing about the effectiveness of
those policies and so more predictive of future growth under that incumbent (e.g., Mackuen,
Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2000; Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002).
A third explanation, which has received considerably less attention from political
scientists, stems from research in psychology. Psychologists have documented a pervasive
human tendency to substitute the end for the whole when retrospectively assessing experiences.
More recent work concludes that this behavior reflects an even more general tendency to
substitute one attribute for another without realizing it, a tendency that Daniel Kahneman calls
5

“attribute substitution” (Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2003). When people attempt
to judge a target attribute, such as the change in their welfare under an incumbent president, they
search for a reasonable value. For some judgments, this search finishes almost immediately
because the required value is readily accessible (e.g., the question “How old are you?”). For
many judgments, however, the target attribute does not readily come to mind, but the search for
it evokes related attributes. People then substitute the related attribute for the target attribute,
without realizing it. Regarding the economy, even if voters have a general idea of economic
conditions in previous years (i.e., memory is not a problem), putting all the information together
requires cognitive effort. As a result, voters may simplify the problem they intended to address
(“How well did the economy perform during the president’s term?”) by substituting with an
answer to a related question (“How has the economy been recently?”).
Not only is attribute substitution pervasive, but it appears to be particularly common with
retrospective assessments like those involved with evaluating economic performance during a
presidential term. These assessments are examples of what Kahneman (2002) calls extensional
attributes, defined as aggregated properties of the evaluation targets such as those that involve
summing over a period of time. Since these attributes are generally not readily available to
individuals—they require calculations—people are especially prone to substituting other
attributes such as the end. Indeed, people seem to evaluate entire experiences from colonoscopies
to shopping according to the conditions at the peak and at the end, a phenomenon sometimes
referred to as a “Peak-End Rule” (e.g., Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Fredrickson and
Kahneman 1993). The peak part of the rule has figured less prominently in subsequent research
than in the early studies of colonoscopies and aversive sounds—possibly because peak pain or
discomfort is more salient—suggesting that the end part of the rule is more robust to other
environments (e.g., Ariely 1998).
6

A series of experiments conducted by Kahneman et al. (1993) provides an example of
this research. Participants began the studies by immersing one hand in very cold water for ten
seconds. The researchers then told participants to expect three more trials of this kind, but
actually conducted only two. In the Short trial, participants kept one hand in water at 14°C for 60
seconds. In the Long trial, the immersion lasted 90 seconds. The experimenters kept the water at
14°C for the first 60 seconds, at which point they gradually raised the temperature from 14°C to
15°C over the next 30 seconds (unbeknownst to the participants). After a seven minute delay, the
researchers called participants for a third trial, informed them that they would repeat one of the
two previous procedures, gave them a choice of whether the first or the second trial should be
repeated, and asked them to answer several questions about the first two trials.
The results were striking. Even though participants experienced more total pain in the
Long trial, a large majority preferred to repeat it. The slight decrease in pain in the last 30
seconds of the Long trial led participants to remember the entire trial as less painful than it
actually was—they judged the experience on the end rather than the whole. A similar
phenomenon occurs in many kinds of retrospective evaluations, including vacations
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1993), emotional episodes (Varey and Kahneman 1992; Fredrickson
and Kahneman 1993), TV advertisements (Baumgartner, Sujan, and Padgett 1997), gambling
(Ross and Simonson 1991), and academic performance (Zauberman, Diehl, and Ariely 2006).
These studies are also consistent with the finding from the retrospective voting literature
that voters appear to vote as pocketbook voters on their own economic experiences (Kramer
1983; Lewis-Beck 1985), and as sociotropic observers of the national economy (Kinder and
Kiewiet 1981). In the psychological studies, individuals appear to apply the end heuristic not
only when they evaluate their own experiences, but also when they evaluate the experiences of
others. In their study of colonoscopy patients, for example, Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996)
7

found an end heuristic explained not only patients’ evaluations of their colonoscopy experiences,
but also the administering physicians’ estimates of the pain that their patients experienced.
Moreover, when asked which patients should have received more anesthetic, the doctors
answered not according to total pain, but on pain at the peak and the end. Studies have found
similar end bias when participants evaluated data on people's discomfort with unpleasant
experiences, such as listening to loud drilling noises (Varey and Kahneman 1992), when
participants evaluated data on factories’ production of defective products (reject rate), and when
they evaluated tests of other individuals’ intelligence (Zauberman, Diehl, and Ariely 2006). In
short, observers appear to apply (or misapply) the same end heuristic in retrospective evaluations
as those undergoing the experiences. They both substitute the end when evaluating the whole.

Summarizing the Surveys and Experiments
As described earlier, we use a series of surveys and experiments to disentangle competing
explanations for why sociotropic voters put so much weight on the election-year economy. Table
1 presents a list of the studies that we present in the paper. We also conducted more than a dozen
additional studies that replicate and extend these findings; we present these in the Supporting
Information (SI). In the results that follow, we refer to these studies by letter. When presenting
regression results and summary statistics in the tables that follow, we include the study identifier
so that readers can easily trace results back to the sample that generated them by referring to
Table 1.

Voters’ Actual and Intended Behavior
Before examining the underlying reasons, we describe the extent to which voters assign
extra weight to the election-year economy. Many studies have documented that voters’ decisions
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depend on election-year growth rather than cumulative growth during the entire term (e.g.,
Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004). Figure 1 illustrates this
pattern, showing the relationship between the incumbent party’s vote margin and election-year
income growth. The relationship is strikingly strong—when incumbents preside over robust
election-year growth, they win in landslides, such as in 1964 and 1984. Similar graphs for
growth in earlier years of a president’s term evince no such relationship.
In Table 2, we show the estimated weights that actual voters assigned to economic
growth in each year of presidential terms, using data from 1944 to 2008. We obtain these
estimates by regressing the incumbent party’s vote share margin on real disposable income
(RDI) growth in each of the previous four years (see Column 1). Consistent with previous work
(e.g., Bartels 2008), each percentage point of election-year income growth increases the
incumbent party’s expected margin by just over four percentage points (b = 4.37, p < 0.01). In
contrast, third-year growth has a much smaller effect (b = 1.48), which is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. First and second year growth have point estimates that are
close to zero. Converting those coefficients to relative weights suggests that voters put 75% of
the weight on election-year growth, 25% of the weight on third-year growth, and no weight on
first-year or second-year growth (see Column 2).
To understand this election-year focus, a fundamental first question is whether this
behavior is intentional. Do voters mean to put so much weight on the election year? Several
explanations suggest that it is intentional. For example, voters may consciously choose to assign
extra weight to the election-year economy if they believe it provides more information than
earlier conditions about incumbent performance and potential future growth under that
incumbent (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).

9

Our survey responses suggest, however, that voters' behavior may not be intentional. In a
nationally representative internet survey fielded by Survey Sampling International in May 2010
(Study A1),5 1602 survey respondents answered the following question: “When evaluating the
economy during presidents' terms, how much weight do you typically give to each year? (Please
enter a percent for each year, with the total equaling 100%.)” The answers were constrained to
sum to 100%. We summarize respondents’ intended weights in the third column of Table 2.
Although voters actually place weight of 0%, 0%, 25%, and 75% on years 1-4, respectively, the
average intended weights in our survey display a different pattern. On average, respondents
reported that they intended to use weights of 20.6%, 22.9%, 27.0%, and 29.6% for years one
through four of a president’s term.6
Of course, these results are only suggestive.7 Not only are they from a single question
from a single sample, but aspects of the question may have led participants to weigh the years
equally. In particular, since participants' weights must add up to 100, a quick solution is 25% for
each year. At the same time, answering 0%, 0%, 0%, 100% is also an easy solution—one that

5

SSI administered the survey between May 17 and May 19, 2010. We did not employ quotas but

asked SSI to construct a target population that matched the (18 and over) census population on
education, gender, age, geography, and income. Although the resulting sample is not a
probability sample, it is a representative national sample on these demographics.
6

We also elicited intended weights from our participants after they completed the experiments

we describe below, and those weights display a very similar pattern (see p. 4 of the SI).
7

In particular, studies have shown that people have difficulties self-reporting on their own

cognitive processes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977).
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much more closely matches voters' actual behavior—but one only 20 of 1602 individuals
provided.
To investigate whether the structure of the question could have led to our findings, we
conducted several additional studies, finding similar results. We present complete results for
these robustness tests in the supporting information (SI). We tried eliminating the easy answer by
requiring the weights to sum to 70% instead of 100% (see pp. 5-6). We also tried providing
participants with predefined sets of weights to choose between, e.g., 0%, 0%, 25%, 75% or 20%,
23%, 27%, 30% (see pp. 7-9).
In case participants simply failed to understand the questions involving weights, we also
tried eliciting their intentions without referring to weights. In Study A2, we asked 572
participants how much their overall evaluation of a president's term would go up if growth
improved in a given year (randomized to be either year 1, 2, 3, or 4). Participants’ response
options ranged from “Does Not Change” to “Goes Up Substantially.” If individuals intended to
place more weight on later years, their evaluations should increase least if presented with a year
1 growth increase and most when presented with a year 4 growth increase. Using a betweensubjects design, we asked participants this hypothetical for only one of the four years: e.g., “by
how much would your rating change if growth in Year 4 was three percentage points higher?”
Since we only asked participants about a single year, they seem unlikely to be motivated by
possible experimenter demand for equal weights. As with the other approaches, participants
responded similarly to all four years (see pp. 10-11 in the SI). In sum, no matter how we elicited
people’s intentions, we arrived at the same conclusion: people intend to weigh all years similarly
with only slightly more weight on later years.

11

Memory-based Explanations
To investigate why voters disproportionately focus on the election-year economy despite
no apparent intention to do so, we start by considering memory. Simply put, voters may lack
memory of economic conditions in earlier years. Even if voters do not entirely forget earlier
conditions, they may primarily put weight on the more recent conditions that they remember
better.
To investigate this explanation, we ran experiments where we showed participants
information about the economy during presidents' terms. Our motivation was to remove memory
constraints about economic performance. In the first experiment (Study B1), participants saw bar
plots of income growth showing all four years of historical terms (1941-2008). We presented
these plots without referring to the presidents who presided over each term. Figure 2 presents an
example of these bar plots (see the SI for complete instructions). These 17 terms are the same
ones we used in the regression to estimate the actual weights that real-world voters used (Table
2).8 Below each plot, we asked, “How would you rate the condition of the national economy
during this period? Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?” To put income growth
and these evaluations on a similar scale, we recoded responses to vary from 0 to 10, with 10
corresponding to “very good.” We take the average of the responses for each of the 17 terms and
call this variable Economic Evaluations.
For this study, we recruited 232 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web
service, accepting only those with a 90% or better acceptance rate on previous work, and paying
8

We labeled those terms as referring to second-term presidents. We explain the motivation in the

next section.
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them $.25.9 As we note in a later section, the main findings replicate in a nationally
representative sample. Before analyzing the data, we dropped participants who failed to evaluate
every term or who failed a test of attention to instructions (about 10% of the sample). We follow
similar procedures for all the Mechanical Turk studies.
Even when presented with data from all years in a simple format, respondents put
substantially more weight on the economy in the final year of presidents' terms. To illustrate this
behavior, consider the two examples in Figure 2. In the top panel, which shows Bill Clinton's
first term, growth was only moderate on average, but ends on a relatively strong note. In the
bottom panel, which shows Jimmy Carter's only term, cumulative growth was actually stronger
than in Clinton's first term, but slows substantially by the election year. Even though cumulative
income growth was higher during Carter's term (6.9% versus 6.2% in Clinton's), participants
rated the economy during Clinton's first term as much stronger. On a 10-point scale, they rated
Clinton's as 6.2 on average and Carter's as only 3.9 (p < 0.001 for the two-tailed test of equality).
Participants therefore appeared to focus more on the end, even though they could see all four
years and even though we only asked them about the economy’s condition, not about the
president's performance.
In Table 3, we show that this pattern holds more generally. To do so, we estimate a
regression similar to the retrospective voting model in Table 2, but now with our participants’
ratings of the 17 historical economies as the dependent variable (instead of incumbent party vote
margin). That is, to determine the influence that each year had on participants’ economic

9

Please see the SI , as well as Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012), for additional details on

Mechanical Turk as well as our samples.
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evaluations, we regress participants' average ratings of these economies on the percentage
change in income growth in each of the four years (so the N is 17, not 232).10 As shown in the
first column, participants did indeed overweigh the last year, putting an estimated weight of 0.81
on Year 4 growth, compared to -0.13, 0.16, and 0.49, for Years 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Even though we presented the data from the historical record without presidents’ names,
participants’ evaluations responded to these economies much as real-world election results did.
To illustrate this similarity, we recoded both the incumbent party’s actual vote margin in these 17
elections (the dependent variable (DV) in column 1 of Table 2) and our economic evaluations
variable (the DV in column 1 of Table 3) to vary from 0 to 1. Then we regressed each of these
rescaled variables on income growth in the four years of presidents' terms. The results indicate
that real-world voters and our experimental participants weighed each year of economic growth
similarly, even though voters experienced actual income growth, while our respondents only saw
it on their computer screens. The point estimates suggest that our experimental participants may
put somewhat more weight on Years 2 and 3 than did real-world voters, but the point estimates
for Years 1 and 4 are nearly the same. To illustrate this correspondence visually, Figure 3 plots
the incumbent party's actual vote share margin from 1944-2008 against the average rating of the
economy by our experimental participants, showing that our participants’ ratings predict the

10

We also estimated specifications in which our dependent variable was the individual

evaluation, rather than the average across all of the subjects. With or without subjects fixed
effects, we obtain similar results for the coefficients for each of the years. We focus on the
results obtained by averaging across subjects because it leads to the most conservative statistical
inference.
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actual election results with remarkable accuracy. This similarity in responses supports the
external validity of the experimental results.
Since we use historical data for Study B1, a potential concern is that fourth-year income
growth may follow a unique pattern that could drive these findings.11 To address this concern,
we ran a replication study (Study B2) where 209 participants observed growth rates that, rather
than drawing from the historical record, we drew at random from a normal distribution that
reflects the income growth rates prevailing in the postwar period (mean growth equal to two with
a standard deviation also equal to two). We randomly selected 25 four-year terms in this way.
Again, we found that participants put extra weight on Year 4. The last column of Table 3
presents the results. Participants put roughly 2.4 times more weight on Year 4 than Year 3 (p =
0.03) and 3.1 times more weight on Year 4 than Year 2 (p = 0.04). In the SI, we report additional
replications, including a replication of the historical data experiment (see p. 13), a replication
with income-growth bars shown horizontally instead of vertically with the most recent year on
top (to rule out a simple visual explanation, see pp. 14-15), several replications with hypothetical
data (see p. 16), and finally one where we relabeled the plots as describing the murder rate under
governors (see p. 16). In all the studies, we find the same pattern of overweighing later years,
especially the last year.
Altogether, the results indicate that, even when people observe information from all four
years of presidents' terms displayed in an equally salient way, they continue to assign extra
weight to conditions in the most recent year. They even appear to behave similarly to real-world

11

Fourth-year income growth does appear somewhat unusual, correlating less strongly with

other years in the term than those other years correlate with each other (see p. 27 of the SI).
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voters. The results therefore imply that memory—mainly the absence of memory—cannot
explain most of voters’ focus on economic conditions at the end of presidents’ terms, even
though it may still play some role for real-world voters who lack the information that our
participants observed. Our findings suggest that voters would continue to focus on the end even
if they knew income growth in all four years.

Do Voters Think the Election-Year Economy is More Informative?
If it is not memory, do voters put extra weight on the election-year economy because they
see it as being more informative about incumbent performance or future growth? As discussed
earlier, voters may perceive election-year economic conditions as more informative about
incumbents' ability to manage the economy, and so more predictive about future growth under
that incumbent (Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2000;
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).12 Voters may think along these lines especially with
first-term presidents, whose policies may take time to influence the economy.

12

While voters could perceive the election-year economy to be a better predictor of future

growth than conditions in earlier years, actual election-year RDI growth does not predict future
RDI growth particularly well. We present evidence on this point in the SI but stronger evidence
comes from Achen and Bartels’ (2004) finding that those incumbents whom voters reelect, who
generally presided over strong election-year economies, did not produce higher levels of postelection GDP growth than would have been produced by those incumbents who voters did not
reelect. Using a different specification, Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993, 20) reach a
similar conclusion.
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Several findings we have already presented are inconsistent with this explanation. First,
citizens’ stated intentions to put similar weights on all four years suggest that they do not
perceive the election-year economy to be more informative than conditions in earlier years.
Second, the experiments described above asked not for prospective judgments or evaluations of
incumbents' performance, but only for evaluations of economic conditions during the terms (the
murder rate study asked about performance, with the results essentially unchanged). Third, in the
experiments described in the previous section (Studies B1 and B2), we told participants that the
income growth data were from the incumbents’ second terms.13 We did so precisely to address
the concern about first-term presidents' policies taking time to influence the economy. As a
result, seeing later years in these experiments as more informative about incumbent quality
seems especially unlikely. Participants would have to believe that year eight of an incumbent's
term is considerably more informative about the incumbent’s quality than, say, year six.
To further assess whether voters perceive the election-year economy to be particularly
informative, we conducted additional surveys and experiments. As a starting place, we first
investigated whether participants saw income growth from particular years as more informative
about income growth in future years (Study C1). After 232 participants rated 17 real-world
economies for the experiment we presented earlier (Study B1), we asked, “Say you were trying
to forecast the average economy in the four years following these periods. Would all years
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To check whether participants read and remembered these instructions, we asked them at the

end of a replication study (see page 13 in the SI) whether these hypothetical presidents were in
their first terms, second terms, or third terms. Of the 64 respondents in the replication study, only
one answered this incorrectly. The results are identical when we exclude this individual.
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during these terms be equally predictive of the future? Would later years matter a little more or a
little less than earlier years? Tell us what you think by assigning percentage weights to each
year.” Based on their responses, participants did not appear to see later years as considerably
more informative: the average weights they reported are 19.8%, 22.8%, 26.5%, and 30.9%,
respectively (see p. 17 of the SI for details). Although this study's 232-sample is not a random
sample, the answers that respondents gave are similar to the overall weights for related questions
in both the nationally representative sample and the other online samples reported above.
As with our studies on voters’ intended weights, we conducted several studies to address
potential concerns and alternative explanations for this result, but always found a similar result.
The SI presents the details. First, we replicated this study with a different sample (see p. 18).
Second, we asked a sample of 257 participants how a hypothetical income growth change in a
given year would affect their projections of future growth, randomizing whether respondents
observed a year 1, 2, 3, or 4 growth increase (see p. 19). Third, in a nationally representative
sample with 987 participants, we asked participants during the 2012 election year a
straightforward question about how important economic conditions were for predicting growth
over the next four years, randomly assigning respondents to respond to increased growth either
“this year,” “last year,” “two years ago,” or “three years ago” (see p. 20). In a fourth study, we
elicited the valuation that subjects put on the growth rate for a given year by asking them to
predict future growth after being given the opportunity to obtain information (see p. 21). These
latter three studies used between-subject designs where participants evaluated a single year, so
participants were unaware of our interest in how people weigh years relative to each other.
Across the range of question wordings and samples, we find that people do not see the election
year as being much more predictive than earlier years in the term.
As we noted above, the studies where we show participants information on all four years
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of presidents’ terms also seem inconsistent with people seeing later years as more informative.
They seem inconsistent because we asked participants to rate the economies themselves, not the
president's handling of the economy, so participants should not have been considering policy
lags. A concern with those studies, however, is that the language likely raised the salience of
politics, potentially leading participants to answer the economic-conditions question as if it was
about a president’s handling of the economy. If people perceive the election-year economy to be
more informative about presidential performance, they then could have conceivably put extra
weight on the election-year economy even though we asked them to evaluate the economy’s
performance. To address this concern, we conducted another experiment where we again showed
participants four-year economies with randomly-drawn income growth data, but this time we
eliminated all mention of presidents or politics from the recruitment language and from the
experiment itself (Study C2). (See p. 22 of the SI for an example of the plots that participants
observed.) The findings in this experiment did not change. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the
regression weights, showing that participants continued to overweigh later years.
We also conducted another experiment designed to make it particularly implausible that
the final period could be more informative (Study C3). We randomly assigned participants to see
two versions of the 25 hypothetical income growth plots. In the “four-year” condition,
respondents saw plots just like those shown above, except we told them that the plots showed
yearly income growth in a state for a hypothetical governor’s term, instead of a hypothetical
president’s term. In the “four-term” condition, we told participants that the plots showed the
average income growth in each term for governors with especially long tenures: four terms, with
each term consisting of four years. We kept the plots identical except we retitled them and
relabeled the four income growth bars, not as Years 1-4, but as Terms 1-4. Figure 4 shows an
example. If voters simply viewed the last year of a term as more informative, the tendency to
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give extra weight to later data points should diminish in this condition due to the long period
covered by four gubernatorial terms. In fact, however, participants continued to put substantially
more weight on growth in the last period. Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for these
two conditions. The pattern of weights is largely the same whether participants are evaluating
four years (Column 2) or four terms (Column 3).
Finally, we considered the possibility that participants’ behavior could arise due to a
perception that peaks or trends are particularly informative about economic performance. As we
noted earlier, psychology studies have found that peaks (or troughs) and trends can influence
retrospective judgments, though they appear to do so less often than do conditions at the end.14
To investigate whether peaks or troughs could account for the weight participants put on the
election year, we pooled data from five hypothetical yearly income growth studies (e.g., B2 and
replication studies). We found little sign that years with the most or the least income growth
(peaks or troughs) influenced evaluations. On the other hand, we did find some evidence that
trends matter, especially downward trends, but controlling for trends left our main findings
unchanged. That is, trends do not account for participants’ tendency to focus on Year 4 growth.
Please see the SI for the analysis (pp. 23-24).

Aligning Voters’ Actions with Their Intentions
The previous three sections presented an array of evidence inconsistent with the memory
and informativeness explanations for voters’ emphasis on the election-year economy. In contrast,

14

For example, Carmon and Kahneman (1996) found that respondents only applied an end rule

when retrospectively evaluating experiences of waiting in line (Kahneman 2000).
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the end-heuristic explanation can account for the findings. In this section, we directly test a key
end-heuristic prediction—one that the other explanations do not predict. If voters are
inadvertently applying an end heuristic—substituting economic growth at the end for economic
conditions throughout the term—then curing this tendency should be straightforward. We should
only have to make the attribute people say they are searching for, something approaching total
growth, readily available, and people will apply the decision rule they say they intend to
implement.
To test this prediction, we conducted several experiments. The first had two conditions
(Study D1). In the control condition, participants saw yearly growth plots just like those
described in the earlier experiments. In the treatment condition, participants saw both yearly
growth and cumulative growth (one on top of the other). Figure 5 (top) presents an example. The
cumulative growth plot simply adds up the current and prior year growth.15 The figure makes
cumulative growth readily accessible but also allows participants to choose between yearly
growth and cumulative growth.16 In the instructions for the study, we provided a brief

15

We calculate yearly growth and cumulative growth with natural logs, i.e., yearly percent

change = ln(RDIt) – ln(RDIt-1). This method converts gains and losses to an equivalent scale and
means that cumulative change can be calculated by adding up the yearly percent change from
each year.
16

In a pilot study, we showed one group just the cumulative plots and the results were essentially

the same. However, we were concerned about participants potentially misinterpreting the
cumulative growth bars as referring to yearly growth. By showing participants both, the
experiment forced them to choose, making misunderstanding less of a concern.
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explanation of how cumulative growth relates to yearly growth, an explanation that accompanied
each cumulative plot.17 The study had 25 terms and used simulated data as described for the
earlier studies.
When yearly growth and cumulative growth are equally available, do people focus on
cumulative growth? In other words, do they no longer put extra weight on the change in income
occurring in Year 4? Table 5 shows estimates of the weights given to each year’s income growth
for both conditions. When participants saw the standard plot, the end mattered more, as in the
studies above. When participants saw both the yearly and cumulative plots, however, they gave
roughly equal weight to each year. The weights change from 0.12, 0.37, 0.46, and 0.59, for years
1-4 respectively, to 0.44, 0.50, 0.54, and 0.50. The ratio of the weight participants place on the
fourth year relative to the first decreases substantially, from 4.92 to 1.11 (p < 0.01).18 When we
give participants equal access both to cumulative growth and to yearly growth, they therefore
rely on the attribute—cumulative growth—that is more informative about overall performance.19
One potential concern with presenting data in this format is that people may not think in
cumulative percentage terms. Another, more intuitive way to make overall economic

17

After rating all the terms, we tested participants’ understanding of cumulative growth by

asking them a simple question that involves calculating cumulative growth from yearly growth.
Ninety percent of the participants answered correctly.
18

This test is based on results from individual-level regressions.
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Moreover, we can reject the hypothesis that people weigh economic conditions in line with

their intentions when they only see growth information (p < 0.001), but not when they see both
growth and cumulative information (p = 0.156). See p. 28 of the SI for details on these tests.
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performance easily available is simply to show the level of per-capita income in each of the four
years. For example, participants could see that per-capita income was $32,500 in the first year,
$34,000 in the second, etc. By comparing the fourth year to the first year, participants can easily
see the cumulative growth that occurred.
To determine whether presenting income in levels would also eliminate end bias, we
conducted another experiment (Study D2). We randomly assigned participants to see yearlygrowth plots or plots that showed both yearly growth and income in levels. Figure 5 (bottom)
presents an example of these plots.20 We drew the initial value (the Year 1 per-capita income
level) from a normal distribution with a mean of $32,000 (the average per-capita RDI since
2000) and a standard deviation of 100. One issue with the level plots is that respondents cannot
observe growth for the first year. For them to see first year growth, we would have to show them
per capita income from the last year of the previous administration. As a result, we estimate the
weights that participants assign to the growth rates that occur in each of the preceding three
years, as opposed to four years.21
As with the cumulative plots, the level plots also appear to reduce the extra weight voters
assign to the election-year economy. Column 3 of Table 5 shows the weights for the control
condition (growth only) and column 4 does so for the level condition, using the identical

20

Consistent with the cumulative condition, the results refer to subjects who observed growth

data on top and level data on the bottom. We also ran a condition with the level data on top. In
this condition, subjects put slightly, but not significantly, more weight on later years.
21

If we include year 1 growth in the regression, it enters with a near-zero coefficient and the

other coefficients remain nearly unchanged.
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underlying data. Although we cannot compare the first year, the ratio of the weight participants
place on the fourth year relative to the second decreases substantially, from 2.04 to 1.40 (p =
0.02).22 These results suggest that simply showing voters income in levels, in addition to growth,
can reduce the extra weight that people put on the election-year economy.
To address potential concerns with these studies, we conducted six replications. One
concern is that the sentence explaining cumulative growth that we added to the standard
instructions from Study B1 could have led participants to privilege cumulative growth over
yearly growth—though the condition with income in levels lacked any additional instructions
and produced similar weights for all years. Another concern is that we asked participants not
about presidential performance, but about the economy during the term, which could push people
towards weighing all years equally in the cumulative and in the level conditions—though it
obviously did not do so in the yearly growth conditions from the previous section. To address
these concerns, we replicated the cumulative study twice. In the first, we explained yearly
growth with equal detail as cumulative growth (see p. 29). In the second, we did not explain
cumulative growth in any detail (i.e., identical instructions as in the conditions with only yearly
growth, see p. 30). In both replications, we also asked about the president’s performance on the
economy rather than the economy itself.23 We likewise replicated the level experiment with the
president’s performance question (see pp. 31-32). We also worried that the steadier upward trend
often seen in level or cumulative growth plots could explain people’s responses, so we replicated
the results showing participants growth and level information in text form rather than in graph

22

This test is based on results from individual-level regressions.

23

We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing these concerns to our attention.
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form (see p. 33). Finally, we replicated these findings in a nationally representative internet
sample that observed only a single term, a between-subject design (see pp. 34-35). Across all
these studies, the primary results remain the same.
Our potential cures for myopic voting—presenting cumulative growth or income in
levels—are in keeping with other research on reducing an end heuristic’s impact on retrospective
evaluations. For example, Liersch and McKenzie (2009) showed participants pain sequences
supposedly experienced by others and had them retrospectively assess the overall pain
experienced. Consistent with our studies, they also found that the end heuristic no longer
dominated evaluations when they presented participants with plots of cumulative pain.
Taken together, the findings in this section provide further evidence for the end-heuristic
explanation. Voters appear to want to evaluate the economy as a whole, not just the end.
However, since the whole is not readily available to them—it requires adding up growth across
years—they substitute the end. When people observe cumulative growth or income in levels so
that the whole is equally available, they no longer make this substitution. Instead, they evaluate
the economy as they intend to, focusing more on overall growth. In contrast to the alternative
hypotheses described earlier, only the end-heuristic hypothesis predicts this pattern.

Conclusions
Voters’ tendency to focus on election-year performance has substantial consequences for
policy and election outcomes. It will lead elections to favor the best manipulators as opposed to
the best stewards of overall economic prosperity. In addition, it incentivizes incumbents to take
action to inflate election-year growth even at the cost of larger long-term economic damage.
Such election-year machinations have led to post-election inflation and recession in countries
ranging from the U.S. to Mexico (Greider 1989; Drazen 2001; Gonzalez 2002; Rogoff 2004).
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Also, since even the best manipulators have limited control over short-term economic conditions,
voters’ extra weight on the election-year economy may turn elections into a game of "musical
chairs," with voters judging incumbents on whether the business cycle happens to be up or down
in the election year (Achen and Bartels 2004).
The studies presented in this paper help us understand the underlying causes and potential
solutions to this phenomenon. Instead of limited voter memory or voters perceiving the electionyear economy as particularly informative, our findings support a simple explanation based on
research in psychology. Voters appear to judge incumbents on the election-year economy
because conditions at the end are an easily available attribute that they can substitute for the
entire experience—in lieu of engaging in the more complicated task of evaluating the whole
period. Previous research suggests that people inadvertently engage in this kind of attribute
substitution for precisely these kinds of retrospective assessments, whether for colonoscopies or
economic evaluations, that require summing up a series of previous experiences. Our results are
thus consistent with the finding that, when making quick intuitive judgments, “people take their
heuristics off-the-shelf, use them unknowingly and automatically, and rarely worry about their
accuracy” (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000), a pattern that holds not only for amateurs, but also for
experts such as statisticians making quick judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1971).
On one hand, our results are discouraging. They imply that the high weight voters assign
to the election-year economy does not reflect an intentional decision, such as one based on the
belief that election-year growth is more informative or does a better job of forecasting the future.
They also imply that the end heuristic should influence decisions across other domains of
incumbent performance, not just the economy, and so may pose a more general problem for
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democratic accountability.24 In addition to holding for different offices, term lengths, visual
presentations, and question wording, our findings also remained essentially the same when
participants observed plots referring to crime rather than the economy.
On the other hand, the end-heuristic explanation implies a simple fix. Since voters do not
intend to overweigh the election year, they should correct the bias when overall growth is easily
available. This is precisely what we found. While voters are not likely to observe the plots that
our respondents saw, our results indicate that relatively simple changes in the information
context may enable voters to hold their leaders accountable more effectively. Even without the
graphs, simply focusing on cumulative growth or income in levels in economic news and
discussions may be enough to change voter behavior. Government departments, the news media,
or even candidates thus may be able to reduce voters’ unintentional shortsightedness by changing
how they frame economic data.
Of course, curing this tendency in the real world may be much more difficult than in the
lab. For one, representing the complicated process of retrospective voting is difficult with any lab
studies, even with the variety of conditions we presented in the paper. In addition, the immediacy
of the current economy and voters’ limited incentives to learn about politics (Downs 1957) are
formidable barriers. Nevertheless, understanding that voters’ focus on the election-year economy
reflects a cognitive bias not only provides a fuller picture of the retrospective voter, but also
makes it possible to test potential solutions that could improve democratic accountability.
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For example, Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) reference the “peak-and-end” heuristic to

explain voters’ reactions to government disaster response before elections, an interpretation that
our results support.
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Table 1:
Descriptions of Surveys and Experiments
Motivation

Description

N

1. Survey about how much weight voters intend to place on
the economy in each year of presidential terms

1602

2. Experiment where we elicited weights without directly
asking participants about weights

572

A. Elicit intended weights

1. Experiment showing participants income growth from
B. Test explanations based the historical record for presidents
on memory and salience
2. Experiment showing participants hypothetical (randomly
drawn) income growth for presidents

C. Test explanations
based on the end
potentially being more
informative

232
209

1. Survey about how predictive each year of the term is for
future income growth (same sample as B1)

232

2. Experiment showing participants hypothetical income
growth for four-year periods, but with no mention of
politics, presidents, terms, etc.

81

3. Experiment where participants saw either four years or
four terms of income growth under governors (growth
randomly drawn)

139

1. Experiment where participants saw either yearly income
growth or both cumulative and yearly growth for the same
D. Test end heuristic
explanation by looking for underlying data
ways to eliminate the
2. Experiment where participants saw either yearly growth
election-year emphasis or both income in levels and yearly growth for the same

116

187

underlying data
Notes: We conducted these studies between March 2010 and July 2012. Study A1 was a nationally
representative sample (on demographics) collected by Survey Sampling International in May 2010. The other
studies listed here use Mechanical Turk samples. We also conducted numerous replication studies and several
pilot studies, some of which used student subjects. We report these in the Supporting Information.

Table 2:
Actual and Intended Weights for Income Growth
Actual weights from presidential elections
Regression estimates for Regression estimates
actual vote share
converted to %
(1944-2008)
weights
(1)
(2)

Intended weights
Large-scale internet
sample
(3)

Year 1 Growth

-0.032
(0.70)

0%

20.6%
(0.3%)

Year 2 Growth

-0.43
(0.70)

0%

22.9%
(0.2%)

Year 3 Growth

1.48
(0.94)

25%

27.0%
(0.3%)

Year 4 Growth

4.37
(1.07)

75%

29.6%
(0.4%)

R-squared
Number of terms
Number of participants
Study

0.64
17
1602
A1

Notes: The question asked in column 3 was: “When evaluating the economy during presidents' terms, how much
weight do you typically give to each year? (Please enter a percent for each year, with the total equaling 100%.)”
Respondents’ answers were constrained to sum to 100%. Standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized
coefficients). The constant is not shown.

Table 3:
Responses to Historical Income Growth and to Hypothetical Income Growth
Historical Data
Rescale dependent variable

Hypothetical Data

(2)

Participants'
Economic
Evaluations
(3)

Participants'
Economic
Evaluations
(4)

-0.13
(0.061)

-0.0009
(0.021)

-0.020
(0.0098)

-0.13
(0.12)

Year 2 Growth

0.16
(0.061)

-0.013
(0.021)

0.026
(0.0098)

0.21
(0.13)

Year 3 Growth

0.49
(0.081)

0.044
(0.028)

0.080
(0.013)

0.27
(0.11)

Year 4 Growth

0.81
(0.093)

0.13
(0.032)

0.13
(0.015)

0.66
(0.15)

0.92

0.64

0.92

0.66

Number of terms

17

17

17

25

Number of participants

232

232

209

Participants'
Economic
Evaluations
(1)

Actual election
results (1944-2008)

Year 1 Growth

DV:

R-squared

p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
Year 1 weight
Year 2 weight
Year 3 weight
Study

<0.001
<0.001
0.030
B1

<0.001
0.037
0.030
B1

Notes: Regression standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized coefficients). The constants are not shown.

B2

Table 4:
Robustness Checks: Weights for Hypothetical Growth Data

DV:

Gubernatorial experiment
Evaluated over Evaluated over four
Political context
four years
terms
removed
Participants' Economic Evaluations
(1)
(2)
(3)

Year 1 Growth

0.22
(0.062)

0.11
(0.080)

0.18
(0.070)

Year 2 Growth

0.43
(0.055)

0.26
(0.073)

0.33
(0.070)

Year 3 Growth

0.49
(0.064)

0.40
(0.10)

0.47
(0.10)

Year 4 Growth

0.72
(0.058)

0.69
(0.066)

0.64
(0.067)

0.93

0.93

0.89

Number of terms

25

25

25

Number of participants

81

65

74

<0.001
0.003
0.010

<0.001
<0.001
0.027

<0.001
<0.001
0.181

R-squared

p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
Year 1 weight
Year 2 weight
Year 3 weight
Study

C2

C3

Notes: Regression standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized coefficients). The constants are not shown.

Table 5:
Eliminating the Election-Year Emphasis: Cumulative Growth and Level Plots
Cumulative growth experiment
Income-in-levels experiment
Cumulative and
Income in levels
Yearly growth
Yearly growth
yearly growth
and yearly growth
Participants' Economic Evaluations
DV:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Year 1 Growth

0.12
(0.060)

0.44
(0.063)

0.19
(0.065)

Year 2 Growth

0.37
(0.053)

0.50
(0.056)

0.31
(0.059)

0.39
(0.053)

Year 3 Growth

0.46
(0.058)

0.54
(0.061)

0.40
(0.066)

0.47
(0.065)

Year 4 Growth

0.59
(0.040)

0.50
(0.042)

0.63
(0.055)

0.52
(0.054)

0.93

0.94

0.92

0.90

Number of terms

25

25

25

25

Number of participants

54

62

97

90

<0.001
0.004
0.051

0.412
0.968
0.504

<0.001
<0.001
0.004

0.012
0.507

R-squared

p -values: Comparing Year 4 weight to
Year 1 weight
Year 2 weight
Year 3 weight
Study

D1

Notes: Regression standard errors are in parentheses (unstandardized coefficients). The constants are not shown.
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Figure 1: Election-year Growth and Incumbent Party Vote Share

Figure 2: Examples of Two Plots Shown to Participants in Study B1
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Figure 3: Participants' Evaluations of Actual Growth Predict Incumbent Party Vote Share
Note: This figure plots the incumbent party's presidential vote share margin from 1944-2008 against the
average rating of the economy by our experimental participants in Study B1.

Figure 4: Example of Four-Term Growth Plot for Governors

Figure 5 (top): Example of Cumulative Growth Plots for Study D1

Figure 5 (bottom): Example of Income-in-Levels Plots for Study D2

